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Abstract
We analyze entry in markets where a principal contracts with a privately in-
formed agent. Before learning his production cost, the agent knows his probability
of having a low cost  his ex ante type and decides whether to pay an entry fee
to contract with the principal. There are two cut-o¤ equilibria that determine the
possible types of an agent who actually enters the market, and neither equilibrium
can be discarded by standard selection criteria. Contrasting with standard intu-
ition, in the equilibrium with the highest cut-o¤ an increase in the entry fee reduces
the marginal type of the agent who enters, thus increasing entry and the expected
cost of an entrant. This equilibrium is selected by a criterion based on robustness
to equilibrium risk, even though the equilibrium with the lowest cut-o¤ is Pareto
dominant for the agent. Public policies that increase entry barriers may be welfare
improving.
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1 Introduction
Entry costs a¤ect entry and the characteristics of rms in a market. But although barri-
ers to entry (like minimum capital or advertising intensity, and concession or license fees)
are high in many industries, there is also evidence of high entry rates in markets with
high barriers to entry (see, e.g., Geroski, 1995, and Kessides, 1986, for evidence on decen-
tralized markets). Even in markets based on contracting relations (like labour markets,
procurement and retailing), participation by agents is not costless, since they often pay
substantial entry or search costs in order to be able to contract with a principal. This sug-
gests that the characteristics of agents who contract in a market may not be exogenous,
but may be determined by their entry decisions.
In order to analyze how entry costs and barriers to entry a¤ect entry decisions and
the characteristics of the agents and rms that enter a market, we study a simple model
in which a privately informed agent (e.g., a downstream rm) rst chooses whether to
enter, and then contracts with a principal in the market (e.g., an upstream rm). Before
entering and learning his actual production cost, the agent privately observes his ex ante
type, which is the probability of being e¢ cient and having a low production cost once
hired by the principal. We assume that there is a xed entry cost that determines the
mass of agents (i.e., the ex ante types) that enters the market in equilibrium, because they
expect to obtain positive net prot. After entry, the principal o¤ers a direct revelation
mechanism to the agent to maximize interim expected prot, given his expectation of the
agents ex ante type.
We show that the entry game has two di¤erent cut-o¤ equilibria, in which the agent
enters if and only if his type is su¢ ciently high. In one equilibrium the mass of agents
entering the market is decreasing in the entry cost, a feature that is common to many
standard IO models (see, e.g., Mankiw and Whinston, 1986). In the equilibrium with the
highest cut-o¤ for the agents types, by contrast, the mass of agents entering the market is
lower and an increase in the entry cost reduces the marginal type that enters and increases
the mass of agents in the market.
The intuition for this counterintuitive result is that, if the entry cost increases, the
information rent of the marginal agent type that enters the market has to increase in
order to make entry protable. In the equilibrium with the highest cut-o¤, this extra
information rent can arise through a reduction in the expected probability that an agent
who enters has a low cost, which reduces the distortion that the principal imposes on the
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quantity produced by a high-cost agent.1 In other words, an expansion in the set of ex
ante types of agents who enter the market generates a positive externality on agents in
the market, since it relaxes the rent-extraction/e¢ ciency trade-o¤ faced by the principal
and allows him to increase production. Hence, contrasting with standard intuition, in the
equilibrium with the highest cut-o¤ an increase in the entry cost, or higher barriers to
entry, induces neither a reduction in the mass of agents who enter, nor an increase in the
quality (i.e., in the expected probability of being e¢ cient) of those agents who enter.
We show that neither of the two cut-o¤ equilibria is always Pareto dominant,2 and
that neither of the two equilibria is risk dominant in a simultaneous coordination game in
which players choose among equilibria. Hence, neither of the two equilibria of our model
can always be discarded by standard selection criteria.
Moreover, we also consider equilibrium selection from the point of view of the agent
alone, since he is the player who initiates the game by choosing whether to enter in
our environment. From this perspective, while the equilibrium with the lowest cut-o¤ is
Pareto dominant for the agent, the equilibrium with the highest cut-o¤ is the only one
that is robust to equilibrium riskfor the agent, according to a selection criterion that
we introduce. Specically, we show that while a coordination failure between the principal
and the agent in the equilibrium with the highest cut-o¤ does not induce losses for the
agent, a coordination failure in the equilibrium with the lowest cut-o¤ induces some of the
agents types to earn negative prots in the market. This suggests that the equilibrium
with the highest cut-o¤may actually prevail in the presence of agents that are not willing
to face the risk created by uncertainty with respect to the principals equilibrium choice.
Finally, we analyze the impact of higher barriers to entry on welfare and players
prots, and we show that while in one equilibrium of our model all players, including a
regulator, have an incentive to minimize the entry cost, in the other equilibrium public
policies that reduce entry costs do not necessarily increase welfare and prots. The reason
is that, in the equilibrium with the highest cut-o¤, a marginal increase in the entry cost
increases the set of the agents types that enter the market and hence increases e¢ ciency
by reducing the quantity distortion due to the presence of asymmetric information.
Our assumptions that agents pay the entry cost before observing the contract o¤ered
by the principal, and obtain additional information about their characteristics after entry,
1By contrast, in the equilibrium with the lowest cut-o¤ the extra information rent that the marginal
agent type obtains when the entry cost increases arises through an increase in the probability that this
agent has a low cost.
2More precisely, the equilibrium with the highest cut-o¤ is never Pareto dominant, while the equilib-
rium with the lowest cut o¤ is Pareto dominant for some distributions of the agents type and values of
the entry cost, but not for all distributions and entry costs.
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capture relevant elements of many economic environments. For example, workers often
pay non-negligible search costs to nd potential employers, before learning the precise
terms of the labour contract that they will be o¤ered by an employer and discovering
their productivity for the specic job that they will be required to do. Similarly, con-
sumers interested in acquiring non-standardized products often pay substantial search
costs to locate a seller, before observing the precise sale mechanism used by the seller
and the specic characteristics of the actual product on sale. Moreover, in auctions for
spectrum licenses governments often select the actual allocation mechanism only after a
long consultation process that includes potential bidders,3 who devote substantial internal
resources and hire consultants to participate in the process and prepare for the auction,
before learning the exact mechanism that will eventually be selected by the seller and
obtaining a precise estimate of the protability of the licenses on sale.4 Our analysis
suggests that, in all these environments, a principal may not have an incentive to reduce
entry or search costs that privately-informed agents have to pay to interact with him and
be o¤ered a contract, since a reduction of these costs may actually reduce entry. We
discuss various specic applications of our simple model in Section 6.
Related Literature. Courty and Li (2000) rst considered agents who are privately
informed about the distribution of their ex-post types. In a model of price discrimination
where the buyer is privately informed about the distribution of his valuation, before
learning the actual valuation, they show that the optimal sequential screening policy is
a menu of contracts consisting of an advance payment and a refund payment in case of
no consumption. In contrast to Courty and Li (2000), in our model the principal can
only contract with the agent after he enters and learns his cost, which is arguably a
reasonable assumption in the presence of frictions that prevent ex ante contracting, like
costly experimentation and specialization, or when the principal lacks commitment power.
An intermediate approach is taken by Deb and Said (2015) and the literature on dynamic
mechanism design analyzing a principal who has only partial, or limited, commitment
power.
Entry in an adverse selection framework has also been analyzed in the auction litera-
ture  see, e.g., Samuelson (1985), McAfee and McMillan (1987), Engelbrecht-Wiggans
(1993), Levin and Smith (1994), and Menezes and Monteiro (2000). In these models,
3Our model can be directly interpreted as an approximation of a procurement auction, where compe-
tition among suppliers is expected to be low.
4By contrast, in the literature analyzing entry in auctions, it is commonly assumed that bidders
observe the mechanism before choosing whether to participate.
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however, entry only a¤ects the number of bidders, while the distribution of the agents
types is exogenously xed, because the mechanism is xed by the seller before bidders
decide whether to participate in the auction. Closer to our model is Chakraborty and
Kosmopoulou (2001) who analyze an auction in which bidders observe a private signal on
the common value of the object on sale and pay an entry fee to participate in the auction.
There are two main di¤erences between their model and our paper. First, while entry in
an auction depends on the intensity of competition that bidders expect to face, in our
model there is a single agent. Second, in our model with production the rent/e¢ ciency
trade-o¤bites both on the extensive and on the intensive margin: the protability of entry
is determined by the agents expected information rent, which depends on the quantity
distortion for an ine¢ cient agent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In Section
3, we characterize the equilibria, present the main results, and analyze the e¤ects of
changing the entry cost. In Section 4 we compare equilibria. In Section 5 we analyze
the optimal choice of entry costs by the di¤erent players. Finally, Section 6 discusses
applications of our model and Section 7 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Players and Environment. We consider a market where a principal delegates to an
agent the production of q units of a good, which yields a gross surplus S (q) to the principal.
S () is continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and concave, with S 0 (0) = +1 and
S 0 (+1) = 0. Both players are risk neutral.
The agent privately learns his marginal cost of production  2   ; 	 when he
enters the market, and the probability of the agent having a low cost is  = Pr [ = ]. We
depart from the standard environment analyzed in the literature by assuming that, before
entering the market, the agent is privately informed about   i.e., his ex ante type 
which is distributed on [0; 1] with cumulative distribution functionG (). This assumption
allows us to make the agents entry problem non-trivial: without private information on
, the agent always enters the market (provided that the entry cost is not to high), and
entry provides no information on the agents characteristics to the principal. For example,
before being hired by a rm and discovering his actual marginal cost of production, which
will depend on the specic characteristics of his job, a manager may be better informed
than his potential employer about the likelihood of having a low cost, which also depends
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on his ability and on his current experience and qualication, and this information may
a¤ect his decision to look for a job.
The agent has to pay a xed sunk cost F > 0 in order to enter the market and be able
to interact with the principal. This may be interpreted as a search cost required to nd
a potential employer, or as a cost of entry into the market which represents a barrier to
entry.
Contracts. We assume without loss of generality that the contract o¤ered by the princi-
pal to the agent in the market is deterministic and consists in a menu fq (m) ; t (m)gm2,
which species the quantity q () :  ! R+ produced by the agent and the transfer
t () :  ! R+ paid to the agent by the principal, both contingent on the reported cost
m 2 . A standard version of the Revelation Principle holds in our environment because,
as we will show in Lemma 1, the principal has no incentive to use a wider set of contracts
that include messages on  by the agent.
Therefore, the principals utility is equal to S (q)  t, and the agents utility is
U ()  t  q:
The agents ex ante outside option is normalized to zero (while his outside option after
entry is  F ). We discuss various applications of this simple model in Section 6.
Timing. The timing of the game is as follows.
1. The agent is privately informed about the ex-ante type  and chooses whether to
pay the entry cost F to enter the market and learn his marginal cost .
2. If the agent enters, the principal o¤ers a contract.
3. If the agent accepts the contract, he reports his cost, produces and receives the
transfer.
The assumption that the agent chooses whether to enter before learning his cost is
necessary to make our analysis interesting: an agent who knows his cost never enters the
market. The reason is that an agent with a high cost has no incentive to enter because he
obtains no rent in the market. And, as a consequence, a standard hold up logic implies
that an agent with a low cost does not enter either.5
5Notice that the same unravelling argument also holds in a model with a continuum of possible costs
for the agent: given any candidate equilibrium with entry, since the principal knows the possible costs of
an agent in the market, the agent with the highest cost who should enter has an incentive to deviate and
stay out.
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With an alternative timing in which the agent learns  after the principal o¤ers a
contract, all our results hold if we impose a strong limited liability constraint that
ensures that the agent obtains non-negative utility for each cost  i.e., that t   q  0,
8.6
Equilibrium Concept. A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium consists of a set M  [0; 1] of
ex ante agents types that enter the market, and of a contract fq () ; t ()g2 o¤ered
by the principal and accepted by the agent. M can also be interpreted as the quantity
of potential agents who enter the market, with the principal randomly selecting an agent
among them with whom to contract.
We consider truthful equilibria in which: (i) the principal o¤ers the incentive com-
patible contract that maximizes his expected prot contingent on the correct expectation
about the set M; (ii) an agent enters into the market if, and only if, his expected util-
ity from interacting with the principal (contingent on the principal holding the correct
expectation about the set M) is higher than F .
3 Equilibrium Analysis
3.1 Preliminaries
We start by showing that we can restrict the analysis to contracts that only depend on
the agents cost and to cut-o¤ entry strategies for the agent.
Lemma 1 There is no loss of generality in considering contracts that only depend on the
agents costs, and not on the agents ex ante type.
The reason for this result is simple: after the agent enters and learns his cost, the
agents utility does not depend on his ex ante type  i.e., the Spence-Mirrleescondition
does not hold with respect to  because players contract after entry has occurred.
Let      . Given a contract fq (m) ; t (m)gm2, the incentive compatibility
constraints for a low-cost and a high-cost agent are
U ()  t ()  q ()  t    q   = U  + q   ; (1)
6When the principal o¤ers a contract before the agent learns his cost, contracts must only satisfy an ex
ante participation constraint for the agent. Without limited liability, this constraint is binding (see, e.g.,
La¤ont and Martimort, 2002, Ch. 2, p. 57), the agent obtains no rent (in expectation), and the principal
implements the e¢ cient outcome. Limited liability prevents full surplus extraction by the principal, since
it is equivalent to imposing an interim participation constraint.
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and
U
 

  t    q    t ()  q () = U () q () ;
while the participation constraints require that the contract yields non-negative utility to
the agent, for each realization of his cost  i.e., U ()  0,  = ; .
Standard arguments allow to show that, in equilibrium, only the incentive compat-
ibility constraint of the low-cost agent binds  i.e., condition 1 holds with equality 
and that only the participation constraint of the high-cost agent binds  i.e., U
 


= 0.7
This implies that an agent who has a low cost obtains an information rent equal to
U () = q
 


;
while an agent who has a high cost obtains no rent in the market. As usual, the information
rent is increasing in the quantity produced by a high-cost agent. The agent pays F and
enters if and only if the expected information rent that he obtains from interacting with
the principal is higher than the entry cost  i.e.,
Pr [ = ] U () = q   > F:
Lemma 2 In any equilibrium, the agent adopts a cut-o¤ entry strategy  i.e., there is a
unique value  such that the agent enters if and only his ex ante type is greater than .
The intuition for this result is straightforward. Given a contract o¤ered by the prin-
cipal, the agents information rent is increasing in his probability of having a low cost.
Therefore, if entry is protable for an agent with a given ex ante type, then it is also
protable for any agent with a higher type.
Lemma 2 implies that, in any equilibrium, the set M  [; 1] is uniquely character-
ized by , the lowest agents type who chooses to enter.
3.2 Equilibria
Suppose that there is a cut-o¤ x such that the principal believes that the agent enters in
the market if and only if   x, so that the principal assigns probability
E [j  x] =
Z
x
dG (j  x)
7See La¤ont and Martimort (2002).
8
to the agent having a low cost in the market. Conditional on entry by the agent, the
principal o¤ers the contract fq (m;x) ; t (m;x)gm2 that maximizes his expected prot.
Substituting the binding incentive and participation constraints for the agent, the princi-
pals expected prot is
E [j  x] S (q (; x))  q (; x) q  ; x+(1  E [j  x]) S  q  ; x  q  ; x :
The standard solution to this problem yields no distortion at the top i.e., q (; x) 
q () is such that S 0 (q ()) =   and downward distortion for the ine¢ cient type
i.e., q
 
; x

is such that
S 0
 
q
 
; x

=  +
E [j  x]
1  E [j  x]: (2)
Hence, the principal induces a high-cost agent to produce a quantity that is lower than
the e¢ cient one, in order to make it less atractive for a low-cost agent to misreport his
marginal cost.
It follows that, given an entry cut-o¤ x, the expected information rent of an agent
with type  is
  S 0 1

 +
E [j  x]
1  E [j  x]

:
Let
  (x)  x  S 0 1

 +
E [j  x]
1  E [j  x]

be the expected information rent of an agent of type x, when the principal expects an agent
to enter if and only if   x. In other words,   () represents the expected information rent
of the agent with the lowest ex-ante type who enters the market in an equilibrium. Notice
that: (i) the function   (x) is continuous and non-negative for x 2 [0; 1]; (ii)   (0) = 0
because an agent with type  = 0 is certain to have a high cost an hence obtains no
utility in the market; and (iii)   (1) = 0 because, when the marginal type who enters is
 = 1, the principal knows that an agent in the market has a low cost and hence the agent
obtains no information rent.8 To simplify the exposition, we assume that the function
  () is single peaked.9
8See the Appendix for details.
9A su¢ cient condition for this is that
@2E[jx]@2x  is not too large and that S000 ()  0. In footnote 12
we explain why our qualitative results do not hinge on this assumption.
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The equilibrium cut-o¤ x =  is dened by the zero protcondition
  S 0 1

 +
E [j  ]
1  E [j  ]

  F = 0 ,   () = F: (3)
In fact, condition 3 identies the marginal agents type in equilibrium in the market: an
agent with ex-ante type  is indi¤erent between paying F to interact with the principal
or staying out of the market, given the equilibrium contract that he expects the principal
to o¤er, when the principal correctly believes that the agent enters if and only if his type
is weakly higher than .
Theorem 1 If F < maxx2[0;1]   (x), there are two equilibria of the game: one in which
the agent adopts a cut-o¤ entry strategy  and one in which the agent adopts a cut-o¤
entry strategy , where 0 <  <  < 1. If F = maxx2[0;1]   (x), there is a unique
equilibrium with cut-o¤ entry strategy  = .
For any entry strategy  2 f; g, the equilibrium contract features the equilibrium
quantities q () = S 0 1 () and
q
 
; 

= S 0 1

 +
E [j  ]
1  E [j  ]

;
and the equilibrium transfers t
 


= q
 
; 

and
t () = q
 
; 

+ q () ;
where q
 
; 

is decreasing in .
If F > maxx2[0;1]   (x), the agent does not enter into the market.
Figure 1 shows the function   () and the two cut-o¤ equilibria.10 The shape of the
function   (x) depends on two contrasting e¤ects of a higher cut-o¤ x on the equilibrium
information rent of the marginal agents type. On the one hand, a higher x implies a higher
probability of obtaining an information rent for the marginal agents type. On the other
hand, however, a higher x also increases the principals expectation of the probability
that the agent has a low cost conditional entry  i.e., E [j  x]  and, hence, the
distortion of the quantity produced by a high-cost agent, which reduces the agents rent
(other things being equal). The function   (x) is concave because the e¤ect of an increase
in x on q
 
; x

is stronger when x is larger, since in this case the principal contracts with
10Of course, the function   () should not be interpreted as representing the expected utility that
di¤erent ex ante types of the agent obtain by entering the market.
10
x*v
F
)(xG
*v0 1
Figure 1: Entry cut-o¤ equilibria
an agent who is relatively more likely to have a low-cost, and hence he is more willing to
distort the quantity produced by a high-cost agent. In fact, at the extreme when x = 1,
the principal shuts down production of a high-cost agent, so that the agents expected
information rent must necessarily decrease for x su¢ ciently large.11
Since   () is single peaked by assumption, there are exactly two values of  that
satisfy condition 3, provided F is not too high: the rst e¤ect dominates when   (x) is
increasing and pins down , the second e¤ect dominates when   (x) is decreasing and
pins down .12
Compared to the equilibrium with cut-o¤ , in the equilibrium with cut-o¤ : (i) a
larger mass of the agents types (1  ) enters the market (see Figure 1) and (ii) after
entry the principal contracts with an agent with a lower expected  and, hence, he reduces
the distortion of the quantity produced when the agent actually has a high cost (since
this is relatively more likely in expectation).
Remark. Notice that allowing the agent to send a cheap talk message to the principal
about  before the principal o¤ers the contract does not a¤ect our results. The reason is
that the agent cannot credibly communicate any information with a cheap talk message,
11The properties of the function   () are discussed in more details in the proof of Theorem 1. See also
La¤ont and Martimort (2002, p. 71).
12If   () is not single peaked, there may be more than two equilibria, but the equilibrium with the
highest cut-o¤ always has the same properties of the equilibrium with cut-o¤  in our model.
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since all agents type would want the principal to believe that their type is  = 0 in order
to obtain the highest possible information rent. In other words, in contrast to standard
cheap talk games where senders have di¤erent ideal points, in our model every ex ante
type of the agent has the same ideal point,which is represented by the situation in
which the principal does not distort the quantity of the high-cost agent. Of course, the
principal would like to elicit information on  and contract on it before the agent learns
its cost  see Courty and Li (2000) who analyze a sequential screening model where the
principal has the commitment power to contract with the agent ex ante.
3.3 Comparative Statics
We now analyze the e¤ect of varying the xed cost of entry in the two equilibria of our
model characterized in Theorem 1.
Proposition 1 The cut-o¤  is increasing in F and the cut-o¤  is decreasing in F .
The comparative statics results for the equilibrium with cut-o¤  is consistent with
the results of many standard IO models: as entry becomes more costly, only ex ante types
who expect to be relatively more e¢ cient and have a low cost with higher probability
choose to enter.
By contrast, in the equilibrium with cut-o¤ entry strategy , an increase in the xed
cost of entry reduces the marginal agents type in the market, which yields a higher
probability that the agent enters the market  i.e., a larger set of ex ante types of the
agent enter into the market  and lower expected probability that the agent has a low
cost when he enters. Therefore, when F increases and the equilibrium has cut-o¤ , the
principal interacts with a less e¢ cient agent on average, conditional on entry.
The intuition for this result is as follows: when F increases, the information rent
obtained by the marginal agents type  has to increase in order to induce him to enter
the market. This increase is achieved through a reduction in E [j  ], which reduces
the distortion imposed by the principal on the quantity produced by a high-cost agent.
Hence, contrary to a standard intuition, in the equilibrium of our model with the highest
cut-o¤ an increase in the cost of entry induces neither a reduction in the mass of the
agents ex-ante types who enter the market, nor an increase in the expected e¢ ciency of
an agent who enters.
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4 Comparing Equilibria
In this Section we compare the two equilibria characterized in Theorem 1, in order to
analyze whether there are reasons to expect that any of them may not be played in our
model. We rst show that no equilibrium always Pareto dominates the other and that
both equilibria survive the risk dominance selection criterion (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988)
applied to a coordination game where players choose among equilibria. We then focus on
the agent, the player who chooses rst in our environment. While the equilibrium with
the lowest cut-o¤ yields a higher utility for the agent, the equilibrium with the highest
cut-o¤ is the only one that is robust to equilibrium risk(in a sense that is formalized
below) from his point of view.
4.1 Pareto Dominance
The equilibrium with cut-o¤  yields a higher utility for every agents ex ante type
than the equilibrium with cut-o¤ . First, all types    obtain a strictly higher
information rent in this equilibrium than in the equilibrium with cut-o¤ , because
q
 
; 

is decreasing in  and hence
q
 
; 

> q
 
; 

:
Second, types between  and  also strictly prefer the equilibrium with cut-o¤ ,
because they do not enter the market in the other equilibrium. Third, all types   
are indi¤erent between the two equilibria, because they enter in neither of the equilibria.
From the point of view of the principal, however, no equilibrium is Pareto dominant.
In order to show this, it is useful to notice that, conditional on entry, the principal is
better o¤ in the equilibrium with cut-o¤ , since in this equilibrium he contracts with
an agent who is more e¢ cient on average.
Lemma 3 The principals interim expected prot is higher in the equilibrium with cut-o¤
 than in the equilibrium with cut-o¤ .
For any equilibrium with cut-o¤  2 f; g, the principals expected prot can be
written as
V () = (1 G ()) eV () ;
where eV () denotes the principals interim prot and 1 G () is the probability that
the agent enters. Hence, the di¤erence between the principals expected prots in the two
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equilibria is
V ()  V ()  eV () [G () G ()]  (1 G ()) heV ()  eV ()i ; (4)
which depends on the di¤erences between the probabilities of entry and between the
principals interim prots in the two equilibria.
The rst term of this expression is positive since G () > G (): there is more entry
in the equilibrium with cut-o¤  than in the equilibrium with cut-o¤ , which increases
the principals expected prot (other things being equal). By Lemma (3), however, the
second term of the expression is negative: conditional on entry, the principals interim
prot is higher in the equilibrium with cut-o¤. In general, which of these two contrasting
e¤ects dominates depends on their relative strengths.
When F is su¢ ciently small, the e¤ect of the probability of entry dominates and the
principal always obtains a higher prot in the equilibrium with cut-o¤ . The reason
is that  ! 0 and  ! 1 as F ! 0 (see Figure 1), so that the agent almost never
enters in the equilibrium with cut-o¤  and V () ! 0, while he almost always enters
in the equilibrium with cut-o¤ . By contrast, when F increases, the distance between
the equilibrium cut-o¤s  and  shrinks, which reduces the di¤erence between the prob-
abilities of entry in the two equilibria. In the Appendix we show that, for F close to
maxx   (x), the principal obtains a higher prot in the equilibrium with cut-o¤  when
the c.d.f. G () is concentrated around  = 1.13 In this case, the probability of entry is
almost 1 in both equilibria, and the e¤ect of the principals interim prot in expression
(4) dominates.
Summing up, depending on F and G () either the equilibrium with cut-o¤  Pareto
dominates the equilibrium with cut-o¤  for both the principal and the agent, or no
equilibrium Pareto dominates the other (while the equilibrium with cut-o¤ never Pareto
dominates the equilibrium with cut-o¤  for both the principal and the agent).
Proposition 2 No equilibrium is Pareto dominant for all F and G ().
Therefore, neither of the two equilibria of our model can always be discarded by a
Pareto dominance criterion.
13Formally, this requires the hazard rate of G () to be su¢ ciently small.
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4.2 Risk Dominance
In order to investigate the robustness of our equilibria to the logic of risk dominance, we
analyze a coordination game between the principal and an agent of type , where players
simultaneously choose between the two equilibria of our model, and apply the standard
denition by Harsanyi and Selten (1988) of a risk dominant equilibrium for two-player,
two-strategy game.14
Suppose that the agent plays according to the equilibrium with cut-o¤ x 2 f; g,
while the principal plays according to the equilibrium with cut-o¤ y 2 f; g. In this
case, the agent enters if and only if   x, and the principal o¤ers a contract with quantity
q
 
; y

. Abusing notation, let
U (x; y; )  Ix ()

q
 
; y
  F 
be the utility of an agent of type , where the indicator function Ix () is equal to 1 if the
agent enters and zero otherwise; and let
V (y; x) 
Z 1
x

 
S (q ())  q () q  ; y dG ()
+
Z 1
x
(1  )  S  q  ; y  q  ; y dG () ;
be the expected utility of the principal (since he knows that he contracts with an agent
whose type is weakly higher than x).
Consider the following coordination game, where players simultaneously choose among
the two equilibria of our model.
Agent of type 
Principal
 
 V (; ) U (; ; ) V (; ) U (; ; )
 V (; ) U (; ; ) V (; ) U (; ; )
This game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria: one in which both players choose ,
and one in which both players choose . An equilibrium risk dominates the other if and
14Risk dominance cannot be applied directly to our model because the principals strategy space is not
binary and there is incomplete information. Notice however that, although we have dened our model
as a sequential game, the environment can also be interpreted as a game in which the agent and the
principal choose simultaneously, since the agent reveals his type to the principal only after being o¤ered
a contract.
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only if the product of the deviation losses is highest in the former equilibrium (Harsanyi
and Selten, 1988).
Proposition 3 In the simultaneous coordination game, neither the equilibrium (; )
nor the equilibrium (; ) is risk dominant.
Therefore, neither of the two equilibria of our model can be discarded by a risk dom-
inance criterion.
4.3 Robustness to Equilibrium Risk
We now consider equilibrium selection from the point of view of the agent alone, since he is
the player who moves rst in our environment and chooses whether to initiate interaction
with the principal by entering the market.15 While the equilibrium with cut-o¤  yields a
higher utility for the agent than the equilibrium with cut-o¤  (as we have shown above),
the equilibrium with cut-o¤  is the only one that is robust to equilibrium riskfor the
agent, and may be preferred by an agent who is uncertain about the choice of equilibrium
by the principal.
To see why the equilibrium with cut-o¤  may be preferred by the agent, notice that
an agent with ex ante type higher than  obtains a strictly positive utility from entering
the market in any of the two equilibria, while an agent with ex ante type between  and
 obtains a positive utility from entering in the equilibrium with cut-o¤ , but not in the
equilibrium with cut-o¤ . Therefore, the equilibrium with cut-o¤  may be perceived
as more risky by the agent, if he is uncertain about the equilibrium that will be played
by the principal.
More precisely, suppose that, when choosing whether to enter, the agent expects the
principal to o¤er with equal probability each of the two equilibrium contracts  i.e., a
contract with quantity q
 
; 

or a contract with quantity q
 
; 

for a high-cost agent.
In this case, agents with ex-ante types greater than  enter since they obtain a strictly
higher prot from entering than from staying out, with both equilibrium contracts. By
contrast, agents with ex-ante types lower than  do not enter since they always obtain
a negative prot from entering. For agents with ex-ante types in the interval [; ],
there exists a threshold k 2 (; ) such that agents with ex-ante types 2 (k; ] enter,
while agents with ex-ante types 2 [; k) stay out. Therefore, some agents type that
should enter in the equilibrium with cut-o¤  do not enter in the presence of equilibrium
uncertainty.
15This is consistent with the logic of equilibrium renements for signalling games, that focus on senders.
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To formalize this idea, we introduce the following denition that allows us to select
among the equilibria of our model, when the agent faces some uncertainty about which
of the two equilibrium contracts will be o¤ered by the principal in the market.
Denition 1 An equilibrium with cut-o¤  2 f; g is robust to equilibrium risk for
the agent if all agents types  >  who enter in equilibrium would also enter in the
presence of a positive probability, which may be arbitrarily small, that the principal plays
the other equilibrium.
Based on the discussion above, the only equilibrium that is robust to equilibrium risk
for the agent is the one with cut-o¤ . In fact, if the agent assigns a positive probability
to the principal playing the equilibrium with cut-o¤ , then an agent with ex ante type
su¢ ciently close to  strictly prefers not to enter, since his expected information rent is
lower than F .16
Proposition 4 The equilibrium with cut-o¤  is robust to equilibrium risk for the agent,
while the equilibrium with cut-o¤  is not robust to equilibrium risk for the agent.
Therefore, an agent who is uncertain about the equilibrium that will actually be
played by the principal is likely to select the equilibrium with cut-o¤  rather than the
equilibrium with cut-o¤ , although he obtains a lower utility in the former equilibrium.
Finally, following the Max-Min logic considered in Bassetto and Phelan (2008),
we analyze which equilibrium is selected by a player who maximizes the lowest possible
payo¤ that he may obtain by choosing a particular equilibrium, when the other player
chooses the other equilibrium. In other words, we compare the o¤-equilibrium payo¤s in
the coordination game where players choose among the two equilibria of our model. In
the Appendix, we show that V (; ) > V (; ) and U (; ; )  U (; ; ) 
i.e., both the principal and the agent obtain a higher payo¤ by choosing the equilibrium
with cut-o¤ , when the other player chooses a di¤erent equilibrium from the one they
choose. Therefore, a principal and an agent who prefer the best worst-case scenario select
the equilibrium with the highest cut-o¤ in our model.
16If the function   () is not single peaked and there are more than two equilibria, then the only
equilibrium that is robust to equilibrium risk is the one with the highest cut-o¤.
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5 PlayersChoice of Entry Cost
In this section, we analyze how changes in the entry cost a¤ects social welfare, the agents
expected utility and the principals expected prot. We assume that while players may
be able to change F , they cannot directly inuence entry or the contract o¤ered by the
principal. Moreover, we restrict the analysis to F 2 F ;maxx2[0;1]   (x), with F > 0 and
arbitrarily small  i.e., we assume that players cannot completely eliminate the entry
cost.17 We rst consider the equilibrium with cut-o¤ , and then discuss how the results
change in the other equilibrium characterized in Theorem 1.
Proposition 5 In the equilibrium with cut-o¤ , no player wants to minimize the entry
cost F .
The intuition, as well as the proof, of this result is straightforward. In the equilibrium
with cut-o¤ , choosing F arbitrarily close to zero reduces to zero the probability of
entry and, hence, playersprots and social welfare, which is never optimal for any of the
players.
In reality, players may only be able to modify entry costs marginally, and costs may
be sticky in the short run. For example, entry costs may depend on some exogenous
technological factors on which players only have a limited inuence. To analyze this
context, we conduct a comparative statics analysis starting from a positive and discrete
entry cost and ask whether players have an incentive to slightly reduce or increase this
cost around its initial level. We show that the incentive to change F depends on the
identity of the player who has the ability to marginally a¤ect it.
First consider a social planner. Ex-ante total expected welfare isZ 1

W () dG () ; (5)
where
W ()   [S (q ())  q ()] + (1  ) S  q  ;   q  ;   F
is the (equilibrium) total welfare when an agent of type  enters the market.
17Of course, if F > maxx2[0;1]   (x) no agent enters and total welfare is zero.
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Di¤erentiating (5) with respect to F and rearranging
g ()
1 G()
@@F
W ()| {z }
Entry e¤ect (+)
+ 
@q
 
; 

@
@
@F
E [j  ]| {z }
Production e¤ect (+)
  1|{z}
Entry cost e¤ect ( )
:
A change in the entry cost around the initial level has three e¤ects on welfare. First,
an increase in F reduces  and increases the mass of agents who enter, thus increasing
welfare: the entry e¤ect.18 This e¤ect is proportional to W(), the welfare created in
equilibrium by the marginal type, and to
@
@F
, a measure of how responsive is  to
changes in the entry cost. Second, an increase in F reduces the distortion of the quantity
produced by a high-cost agent, which increases welfare: the production e¤ect.19 This
e¤ect is proportional to , a measure of the severity of the adverse selection problem:
a larger  induces the principal to distort the production of the ine¢ cient type more
(other things being equal), thus enhancing the mitigating e¤ect of an increase on the
quantity distortion. Third, an increase in F increases the entry cost paid by an agent
who enters: the entry cost e¤ect.
In sum, the net e¤ect on social welfare of a marginal increase in F is positive when
the rst two e¤ects dominate the third one. In this case, a social planner can increase
welfare in the market by increasing the entry cost.
Consider now the agent. The ex-ante expected information rent of an agent, net of
the entry cost, is Z 1


q
 
; 
  F  dG () :
Di¤erentiating with respect to F and rearranging
 q  ;   F | {z }
=0
+
Z 1

"

@q
 
; 

@
@
@F
  1
#
dG () =
= 
@q
 
; 

@
@
@F
E [j  ]| {z }
Rent e¤ect (+)
  1|{z}
Entry cost e¤ect ( )
:
A change in the entry cost has two contrasting e¤ects on on the agents expected utility.
A higher F increases the agents expected rent because it reduces the quantity distortion
18Note that, by denition, W() > 0 because if W() < 0 then also the agents rent would be negative
when his ex-ante type is .
19Recall that @q
(;)
@ < 0 because when, the expected probability of the agent having a low cost
increases, the principal has an incentive to distort production for the high-cost agent more.
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imposed by the principal: the rent e¤ect. But a higher F also increases the cost paid by
an agent who enters.
Interestingly, the expression for the e¤ect of a variation in F on the agents prot is
identical to the one for the planner excluding the entry e¤ect. This is because the agent
does not take into account the e¤ect of a change in F on total welfare. Hence, when the
agent prefers to increase the entry cost around its initial level to increase his utility, the
social planner wants to do the same since social welfare is also increasing in F .
Finally, consider the principal. His ex-ante expected prot isZ 1




S (q ())  q () q  ; + (1  ) S  q  ;   q  ; 	 dG () :
Di¤erentiating with respect to F ,
@q
 
; 

@
@
@F
Z 1

  + (1  ) S 0  q  ;   	 dG ()
  S (q ())  q () q  ; + (1  ) S  q  ;   q  ; 	 g () @
@F
:
Using the free entry condition q
 
; 

= F and dividing and multiplying the rst
term by 1 G (), by the Envelope Theorem this expression can be rewritten as
 g ()W () @

@F
;
which is always positive. Hence, the principal always benets from an increase in F : since
quantities are optimally chosen to maximize his prot after entry, the principal simply
wants to maximize entry into the market.
Finally, in the equilibrium with cut-o¤ , all players are harmed by an increase in F
around its initial value because, by Proposition 1, a reduction in F reduces the equilibrium
cut-o¤  and all the e¤ects that we have identied are negative in this case.
6 Applications
Our results can be framed in several di¤erent market applications to analyze entry.
Regulation and procurement. In Baron and Myerson (1982), the principal is a reg-
ulator who maximizes a weighted average of consumerssurplus CS (q) and a regulated
monopolys prot U (q) = t   q, where  is the marginal cost of production and q the
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quantity produced. Letting  be the weight assigned to the monopolists prot, the
principals prot can be written as
V () = CS(q)  q   U (q) :
In this environment,  = Pr [ = ] can be interpreted as an ex-ante idiosyncratic char-
acteristic of a rm that captures, for example, its technological standard or its ability to
successfully perform R&D or other cost-reducing activities; while F can be interpreted
either as a start-up fee or, in the procurement case, as the cost of specialization required
to produce the specic product requested by the procurer.
Our results suggest that, in equilibrium, an increase in the start up fee or in the
specialization cost may result in the selection of a less e¢ cient rm on average.
Non-linear pricing. The principal can also be interpreted as the seller of a good with
marginal cost of production c (q) who faces a continuum of potential buyers. The princi-
pals utility function is
V () = t  c (q) ;
where t represents the price and q the quantity of the good. A buyers utility function is
U () = u (q)  t;
where  is a measure of his taste for the good (as in Maskin and Riley, 1984) or his
preference for higher-quality products (as in Mussa and Rosen, 1978, where q represents
the quality of the good). Changing notation,  = Pr

 = 

can be interpreted as the ex-
ante condence of the buyer in the t between the goods characteristics and her private
tastes; while F can be interpreted as a proxy for search and experimentation costs that
a consumer has to pay in order to reach the seller and discover his actual taste for the
specic good on sale.
Our results suggest that, in equilibrium, higher search and experimentation costs may
result in the seller interacting with buyers who expect to have a lower taste for the good.
Financial contracting. In Freixas and La¤ont (1990), the principal is a lender in a
nancial market who provides a loan of size k, with repayment t, to a borrower. Capital
costs Rk, where R is the risk-free interest rate that the lender would earn in an alternative
investment. Therefore, the lenders prot is
V () = t Rk;
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while the borrowers prot is
U () = f(k)  t;
where f(k) is the return on capital that the borrower is able to generate and  is a
productivity shock. In this context,  = Pr

 = 

can be interpreted as the ex-ante
probability of the borrowers return being high, and F can be interpreted as a xed fee
that the borrower has to pay to submit a loan application.
Our results suggests that a higher submission fee may induce borrowers with a lower
probability of having high return on capital, on average, to apply for a loan.
Labor contracts. In Green and Khan (1983) and Hart (1983), the principal is a union,
or a set of workers, that provides its labor force l to a rm and has full bargaining power
in determining the labor contract. The rms prot is
U () = f(l)  t;
where f(l) is the return on labor, t is the wage, and  is a productivity shock which is
observed by the rm but not by the union. The unions utility function is
V () = t   (l);
where  (l) is the monetary disutility of labor. In this context, F can be interpreted a
xed cost that the rm has to pay to contract with the union.
Our results suggests that, when it is more costly to contract with a union, rms that
expect to be less e¢ cient and have lower productivity, on average, may choose to do so.
Distribution channels. Following the literature on vertical contracting in distribution
channels (e.g., Gal-Or, 1991, 1999; Martimort, 1996; Pagnozzi et al., 2016), the principal
can be interpreted as an upstream supplier who sells an intermediate good to a down-
stream retailer who distributes the nal product to nal consumers and is better informed
than the supplier on some relevant characteristics of the market. Assuming for simplicity
that production is costless for the supplier, its utility function is
V () = t;
where t is the price paid by the retailer and q the quantity of the good. The retailers
utility function is
U () = P (; q) q   t;
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where P (; q) is the demand function and  is a measure consumerspreferences for the
nal product, with @P ()
@
> 0. In this context,  = Pr

 = 

can be interpreted as the
retailers ability to appeal to consumers preferences, while F can be interpreted as a
specialization costs that the retailer has to pay in order to be able to sell the product of
a specic manufacturer.
Our results suggest that an increases in the retailers specialization costs may induce
manufacturer to contract with retailers that are less capable of appealing to consumers
preferences, on average.
7 Conclusions
We studied a simple principal-agent model in which the distribution of the agents type
is endogenous and determined by an entry condition that equalizes the agents expected
information rent to the xed entry cost.
Under standard assumptions, our game has two cut-o¤ equilibria that determine the
mass and the characteristics of agents who enter the market. Contrasting with standard
intuition, in the equilibrium with the highest cut-o¤an increase in the entry cost increases
the mass of agents who enter and reduces the expected e¢ ciency of the entrant. This
equilibrium is selected by a criterion based on robustness to equilibrium risk.Hence,
our analysis suggests that in industries characterized by adverse selection, barriers to
entry may be positively correlated with entry by privately informed agents. Moreover,
increasing entry costs may not necessarily decrease welfare.
Our simple environment has multiple interpretations  like non-linear pricing, nan-
cial and labor contracting, regulation and procurement  and may help interpreting the
e¤ects of changes in entry costs on welfare and prots in a variety of applications.
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A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Because contracts are o¤ered after entry decisions and the agent
discovers his cost, when the agent decides whether to accept the contract in stage 3 his ex
ante type does not a¤ect his utility. Hence, the principal cannot screen the agent along
the  dimension and induce him to reveal his ex ante type. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Fix the contract o¤ered by the principal. If a type  0 chooses
to enter, then  0q
 


> F . Therefore, any type  >  0 also obtains an expected
information rent higher than F and chooses to enter. If a type  00 chooses not to enter,
then  00q
 


< F . Therefore, any type  <  00 also obtains an expected information
rent lower than F and chooses not to enter. 
Proof of Theorem 1. Notice that   (0) = 0 and that (since S 0 (0) = +1)
  (1) =   S 0 1

 +
E [j  1]
1  E [j  1]

=   S 0 1 (+1) = 0:
Moreover,
 0 (x) =   S 0 1 ()| {z }
>0
+ x
()2
S 00 ()
E [j  x]
(1  E [j  x])2
@E [j  x]
@x| {z }
<0
; (6)
where  0 (0) > 0 since the second term of equation (6) is equal to zero when x = 0,
and  0 (1) < 0 since q
 
; 1

= 0. Hence, since the function   (x) is single peaked by
assumption, when F < maxx2[0;1]   (x) equation 3 has exactly two solutions, both strictly
positive and lower than 1. So there are two cut-o¤ entry equilibrium strategies.
The expressions for the quantities chosen by the principal for the equilibrium contracts
immediately follow from the discussion preceding the statement of the theorem and from
equation (2). Finally, the denition of U () and the binding individual rationality and
participation constraints yield the equilibrium transfers.
The quantity q
 
; 

is decreasing in  because @E[j
]
@  0 and S 0 1 () is de-
creasing.
When F = maxx2[0;1]   (x), equation 3 has a unique solution equal to arg maxx2[0;1]   (x).
By contrast, when F > maxx2[0;1]   (x), equation 3 is never satised. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Recall that entry is determined by the condition   () = F
(see condition 3). In the equilibrium with cut-o¤ , by the Implicit Function Theorem
we have
@
@F
=
1
@
@x
  ()
:
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This is negative since @
@x
  () < 0 (because the equilibrium exists if and only if F <
maxx2[0;1]   (x) and   () is single peaked by assumption).
In the equilibrium with cut-o¤ , by the Implicit Function Theorem we have
@
@F
=
1
@
@x
  ()
:
This is positive since @
@x
  () > 0 (because the equilibrium exists if and only if F <
maxx2[0;1]   (x) and   () is single peaked). 
Proof of Lemma 3. For any equilibrium with cut-o¤ entry strategy  2 f; g, the
principals interim expected prot  i.e., conditional on the agent entering the market
 is
eV ()  E [j  ] S (q ())  q () q  ; 
+ (1  E [j  ]) S  q  ;   q  ;  :
Di¤erentiating with respect to  and using the Envelope Theorem,
deV ()
d
=
@E [j  ]
@
( 
S (q ())  q () q  ;  
  S  q  ;   q  ; 
)
:
Hence, since @E[j
]
@ > 0,
deV ()
d
> 0 , S (q ())  q () q  ;  > S  q  ;   q  ;  :
This inequality always holds since, by the denition of q () and strict concavity of S (),
S (q ())  q () q  ;  > S  q  ;   q  ; 
> S
 
q
 
; 
  q  ;  :
Therefore, the principals interim expected prot is increasing in . 
Proof of Proposition 2. In order to prove that there is no Pareto dominant equilibrium
for the principal, we show that the di¤erence between the principals expected prot in
the equilibrium with cut-o¤  and the principals expected prot in the equilibrium with
cut-o¤  is ambiguous and depends on the models primitives.
First, for F ! 0,  ! 0,  ! 1 and, hence, V () > V ().
Let F  maxx2[0;1]   (x). The fact that (   ) ! 0 as F ! F implies that
limF!F [V (
)  V ()] = 0. In order to analyze the di¤erence between the principals
expected prots when F is close to F , we consider a rst-order Taylor approximation for
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F ! F :
V ()  V ()   F   F lim
F!F 
@ [V ()  V ()]
@F
:
Di¤erentiating with respect to F and using the Envelope Theorem,
lim
F!F 
@ [V ()  V ()]
@F
=
h
g (b) eV (b)  (1 G (b)) eV 0 (b)i lim
F!F 

@
@F
  @

@F

;
where b  arg max
x2[0;1]
  (x)
and b 2 (0; 1) by strict concavity of   ().
Therefore, for F su¢ ciently close to F ,
V ()  V ()   F   F hg (b) eV (b)  (1 G (b)) eV 0 (b)i lim
F!F 

@
@F
  @

@F

:
By assumption, F < F , and, by Proposition 1, @

@F
< 0 and @

@F
> 0. Hence, V () <
V () if and only if
g (b) eV (b)  (1 G (b)) eV 0 (b) < 0 , g (b)
1 G (b) < eV 0 (b)eV (b) : (7)
The right-hand-side of condition (7) is strictly positive since eV 0 () > 0 (see the proof of
Lemma 3), eV () > 0, and  < b (implying that eV (b) > 0).
Consider a parametrized c.d.f. G (; ) (with   0, G (0; ) = 0, and G (1; ) = 1)
such that the hazard rate g(;)
1 G(;) is strictly decreasing in   i.e., higher values of  reect
stochastic hazard rate dominance (which also implies rst-order stochastic dominance).20
Moreover, assume that there exists  > 0 such that, when   ,
g (; )
1 G (; ) = 0 8 2 [0; 1] :
That is, for  su¢ ciently large the c.d.f. G (; ) is degenerate around 1. In this case, for
F close to F and  su¢ ciently large, V () < V (). 
Proof of Proposition 3. The equilibrium (; ) risk dominates the equilibrium (; )
if
(U (; ; )  U (; ; )) (V (; )  V (; )) >
> (U (; ; )  U (; ; )) (V (; )  V (; )) ; 8 2 [0; 1] : (8)
20The parametrized exponential and the Gamma distributions satisfy this property.
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By contrast, the equilibrium (; ) risk dominates the equilibrium (; ) if the inequal-
ity sign in condition (8) is reversed. Notice that the di¤erences V (; ) V (; ) and
V (; )  V (; ) are always strictly negative and, by the Inada conditions on S (),
bounded from below. We show that the sign of the inequality in condition (8) depends
on .
First, for types  < , Ix () = 0 for every x 2 f; g and, hence, U (x; y; ) = 0
for every x; y 2 f; g. Second, for types  > , Ix () = 1 for every x 2 f; g and,
hence,
U (; ; )  U (; ; ) = U (; ; )  U (; ; ) = 0:
Therefore, in both these cases, condition (8) holds with equality.
Third, for types  2 [; ], I () = 1 and I () = 0. Hence,
U (; ; )  U (; ; ) = q  ;   F
and
U (; ; )  U (; ; ) = F   q  ;  :
Notice that, by denition of  and :
(i) For  = , F   q  ;  < 0 and q  ;   F = 0;
(ii) For  = , q
 
; 
  F < 0 and F   q  ;  = 0.
Therefore, for  su¢ ciently close to  condition (8) holds; while for  su¢ ciently close
to  condition (8) holds with the inequality sign reversed. 
Proof of Proposition 4. For any probability " > 0 that the principal plays the equilib-
rium with cut-o¤  (and probability (1  ") that the principal plays the equilibrium with
cut-o¤ ), the agent with type  obtains a strictly negative utility form entering and,
by continuity, there always exists a positive mass of the agents types that are su¢ ciently
close to  who also obtain a strictly negative utility form entering. The reason is that an
agent with type  obtains an utility equal to zero when he enters and the principal o¤ers
the contract associated to the equilibrium with cut-o¤ , but obtains a strictly negative
utility when he enters and the principal o¤ers the contract associated to the equilibrium
with cut-o¤  because q
 
; 

< q
 
; 

. Hence, the equilibrium with cut-o¤  is
not robust to equilibrium risk for the agent.
By contrast, the equilibrium with cut-o¤  is robust to equilibrium risk for the agent
because: (i) all the agents types  >  who enter in this equilibrium obtain a strictly
positive utility from entering regardless of the equilibrium played by the principal, and (ii)
an agent with type  obtains an utility equal to zero when he enters and the principal
o¤ers the contract associated to the equilibrium with cut-o¤  and obtains a strictly
positive utility when he enters and the principal o¤ers the contract associated to the
equilibrium with cut-o¤ . Hence, regardless of the probability that the principal plays
the equilibrium with cut-o¤ , all agents types  >  enter the market. 
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Max-Min Logic. First consider the principal. By choosing , he obtains at worst
V (; ); while by choosing , he obtains at worst V (; ). The di¤erence between
these two expected prots is
V (; )  V (; ) = (S (q ())  q ())
Z 

dG () +
+
Z 1


(1  )  S  q  ;   q  ;   q  ;  dG ()
 
Z 1


(1  )  S  q  ;   q  ;   q  ;  dG ()
+
Z 

 
(1  )  S  q  ;   q  ;   q  ;  dG () :
This expression is always positive since:
(i) S (q ())  q () > 0.
(ii) Optimality of q
 
; 

implies that
Z 1


(1  )  S  q  ;   q  ;   q  ;  dG () >Z 1


(1  )  S  q  ;   q  ;   q  ;  dG () :
(iii) Finally, Z 

 
(1  )  S  q  ;   q  ;   q  ;  dG  0
because
(1  )  S  q  ;   q  ;   q  ;  >
(1  E [j  ])  S  q  ;   q  ;   E [j  ] q  ;   0
where the rst inequality follows from  < E [j  ], and the second inequality
follows from optimality of q
 
; 

and the Inada conditions.
Second, consider the agent. By choosing , he obtains, at worst U (; ; ); while
by choosing  he obtains at worst U (; ; ). In this case,
U (; ; )  U (; ; ) ,
I ()

q
 
; 
  F   I () q  ;   F  :
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This inequality always holds since:
(i) For types  < , I () = I () = 0.
(ii) For types  > , I () = I () = 1 and q
 
; 

> q
 
; 

.
(iii) For types  2 [; ], I () = 1, I () = 0, and q
 
; 

< F .
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